No Supreme Court conference this week
The court is hearing oral arguments this week and therefore isn’t holding its usual Wednesday case conference.
The court is hearing oral arguments this week and therefore isn’t holding its usual Wednesday case conference.
The conference list for this week’s conference included the anti-death-penalty writ petition but the conference report did not announce any ruling on that case. And there were no straight grants of review.
Criminal grant and holds. The were a five grant-and-hold orders in criminal cases: two for People v. Emanuel (see here), one for People v. Bankston and People v. Hin (see here), one for People v. Lopez (see here), and one for People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (see here).
Denial with dissenting votes. Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Wong. In that case, the First Appellate District, Division One issued an published opinion rejecting the same argument that the Supreme Court itself rejected yesterday in People v. Williams.
Three Strikes sentencing. In In re Haynie the court ordered the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to appear before the Sacramento County Superior Court and show cause why the petitioner is not entitled to appointment of counsel in light of data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing under the Three Strikes law.
In People v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h), does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding young adults convicted and sentenced for serious sex crimes under the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) from youth offender parole consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Fourth District, Division One and disapproved two earlier decisions.
The majority opinion authored by Justice Jenkins explains that the Legislature had a rational basis to exclude One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility–while not excluding young adults convicted of murder—because of the risk of recidivism that One Strike offenders pose.
Justice Liu dissented, arguing that (1) the legislative history of the statute does not support the theory that the Legislature enacted due to concerns about recidivism, and (2) data shows that sex offenders recidivate at lower rates than non-sex offenders.
Tomorrow the Supreme Court will issue its long-awaited opinion in People v. Williams. The issue presented is: “Does Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h), violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding young adults convicted and sentenced for serious sex crimes under the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) from youth offender parole consideration, while young adults convicted of first degree murder are entitled to such consideration?”
The First District, Division Four issued a published opinion on this issue in 2019 and found an equal protection violation. (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183.) The Supreme Court did not grant review in that case, but granted review in Williams when the published part of an opinion by the Fourth District, Division One disagreed with Edwards.
The Supreme Court granted review in Williams in July 2020.
In In re Tellez, the Supreme Court held that trial courts must advise criminal defendants that they can be civilly committed to a state hospital at the completion of their prison term if they plead guilty or no contest to certain qualifying sex offenses.
The holding doesn’t help the defendant in this case, however, because he failed to demonstrate that he would not have accepted his plea deal if he had been advised by his counsel about the possibility of civil commitment.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Evans (who authored the majority opinion), expressing the view that defense counsel have a duty to advise their clients about the risk of civil commitment, and that failure to do so amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Monday morning, the Supreme Court will file its opinion in In re Tellez. (Briefs here; oral argument video here.) The court will decide whether a criminal defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise that a guilty plea could lead to a lifetime civil commitment as a sexually violent predator after service of a prison sentence. More about the case here and here.
In Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. the Supreme Court resolved a question certified by the Ninth Circuit involving the application of California’s economic loss rule.
The economic loss rule generally prohibits plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in cases involving breaches of contract that cause only economic losses. The Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court to decide the following question: “Under California law, are claims for fraudulent concealment exempted from the economic loss rule?”
The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion discusses the evolution of California law on this issue and concludes that the question the Ninth Circuit should have asked is “Can a plaintiff assert an independent claim of fraudulent concealment in the performance of a contract?” The court then concluded that the the answer to the reframed question is a conditional yes. A plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship, but only if two conditions are met: (1) the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations and (2) the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.
In City of Los Angeles v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, the Supreme Court today reinstated a $2.5 million discovery sanction against the City of Los Angeles, reversing an opinion by the Second Appellate District, Division Five, which held that the sanction exceeded the trial court’s authority.
This passage from the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion succinctly summarizes the court’s holding that trial courts have broad discretion to impose sanctions for a wide variety of discovery misconduct:
Under the general sanctions provisions of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, the trial court had the authority to impose monetary sanctions for the City’s pattern of discovery abuse. The court was not limited to imposing sanctions for each individual violation of the rules governing depositions or other methods of discovery. We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment to the contrary.
Here are some highlights from today’s Supreme Court conference:
Arbitration?: The court granted review in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare. The belatedly published Second District, Division Two, Court of Appeal opinion held the plaintiff parents’ claim for the wrongful death of their son had to be arbitrated because their son had signed an arbitration agreement with the defendant skilled nursing facility where he had been a resident. Even though the parents had not signed an arbitration agreement themselves, Division Two found dispositive the fact that “[t]he arbitration agreement’s plain language manifests an intent between the parties to bind [the son’s] heirs, i.e., the wrongful death claimants, to any claims of professional negligence.” The appellate court rejected the argument that the wrongful death claim is one for dependent adult abuse, not professional negligence. It held the “wrongful death claim sounds in professional negligence” and is thus governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, an arbitration statute in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838.
Arbitration grant-and-holds. Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises and Solis v. Sohnen Enterprises are more grant-and-holds for Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (see here), in which the court is expected to address whether the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) preempts state statutes prescribing the procedures for paying arbitration fees and providing for forfeiture of the right to arbitrate if timely payment is not made by the party who drafted the arbitration agreement and who is required to pay such fees. In a 2-1 published opinion, the Second District, Division Five, held in Hernandez that the California procedural statutes didn’t apply because the parties agreed federal procedures would apply and, in any event, “when an agreement falls within the scope of the FAA and does not expressly select California arbitration procedures, the FAA preempts the provisions of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.97 [governing fee payment] that require finding a breach or waiver of the parties’ arbitration agreement as a matter of law.” The majority disagreed with several other Court of Appeal decisions, including the opinion under review in Hohenshelt. It also concluded the order allowing the plaintiff to withdraw from arbitration was appealable. The dissent asserted “it is a real stretch—and a stretch too far—to say the Federal Arbitration Act is offended by a state law that requires prompt payment of arbitration fees.” Solis is an unpublished opinion from the same Court of Appeal with the same divided result as in Hernandez.
Yet another Riverside ICWA grant-and-hold. In re P.M. is one more grant-and-hold for In re Ja.O. (see here), which is expected to decide whether, under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and complementary state statutory law, the duty of a child welfare agency to inquire of extended family members and others about a child’s potential Indian ancestry applies to children who are taken into custody under a protective custody warrant. The Ja.O. decision will resolve a multi-case split in the Fourth District, Division Two, on the issue. (See here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.) It is also waiting for the finality of Monday’s Supreme Court opinion in In re Dezi C. (see here). The Division Two unpublished opinion in P.M. resolved the Ja.O. issue in the negative and also held any failure to inquire was harmless.
More dissenting votes for review about youth offender parole denial. Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denials of review in People v. Mitchell and People v. Payne. Unpublished opinions in the Second District, Divisions Six and Three, respectively, rejected constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed between the ages of 18 and 26. In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. They have not sought to revisit the equal protection issue, but, after Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from other review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed (see here, here, here, and here).
Juvenile transfer OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in In re Knight, a pro per’s habeas corpus petition. The cause to be shown is “why petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his claims that he is entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 and appellate counsel and counsel on remand rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek such relief.” Regarding Prop. 57, see here.
Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were two criminal case grant-and-holds, both waiting for a decision in In re Hernandez (see here).
Starting tomorrow, I’ll be away until a few days after Labor Day. Horvitz & Levy partner Curt Cutting, the primary writer for the firm’s “California Punitive Damages” blog, will be filling in. But blogging might be lighter than usual.