“Trump administration lifts courthouse raid ban, testing California’s sanctuary law”

Malcolm Maclachlan has an extended report in today’s Daily Journal that begins:

“California Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero told reporters last week that she would not ‘pick a fight’ with the new administration of President Donald Trump. But Trump may have just picked one with her.

“On Wednesday, the administration lifted a ban on conducting immigration enforcement raids in courthouses, schools and other ‘sensitive areas’ where they had been barred under President Joe Biden’s administration. If Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials follow through and begin entering state courthouses, it would effectively cross a line Guerrero laid out during her annual sit-down meeting with reporters on Jan. 16.”

The article says that the Chief Justice declined to comment yesterday.

Related:

Chief Justice pledges to protect court access against disruptive federal immigration actions and addresses a wide range of other issues at her annual meeting with the media

Supreme Court amends its policies and payment guidelines for counsel it appoints in capital and other criminal cases

A California Courts news release by Merrill Balassone reports on Supreme Court changes to its policies and payment guidelines for appointed counsel in death penalty litigation, including direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, and payment guidelines for appointed counsel in all criminal cases.

The news release says the changes “account for developments relevant to the representation of capital inmates before the California Supreme Court, including the passage of Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, and the enactment of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020.” It looks like the policies and payment guidelines also apply to Supreme Court-appointed counsel representing criminal defendants in the superior court.

The revised “Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death” are here and the amended “Payment Guidelines for Counsel Appointed by the Supreme Court Representing Indigent Capital Appellants in California Courts” and “Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, on Optional Basis, to Automatic Appeals and Capital Habeas Corpus Proceedings in California Courts” are here.

Supreme Court expands retroactive application of ameliorative legislation

In People v. Lopez, the Supreme Court today holds a defendant convicted of first degree murder, whose sentence was increased by a jury’s finding that he committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, can challenge the gang enhancement under Assembly Bill No. 333, which limited imposition of the enhancement and was enacted after his conviction. The decision concerns whether the defendant could invoke the ameliorative legislation, legislation which case law says is constitutionally required to have been effective before his judgment became final.

The court’s unanimous opinion by Justice Goodwin Liu notes that “[t]he meaning of finality in the [retroactivity] context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final for purposes of appealability.” In the case before it, the Court of Appeal had remanded the matter for resentencing concerning enhancements other than the gang enhancement and the defendant was awaiting resentencing when the Legislature enacted AB 333.

The court rejects the argument that AB 333 can’t retroactively apply to the defendant because his judgment of conviction and the gang enhancement were final before the statutory changes took effect. “A criminal case is only reduced to a singular, final judgment following the conclusion of the entire criminal case or prosecution,” the court finds, and, “[t]hus, a criminal case in which the sentence is not yet final, including one in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-related issues, is not final for [retroactivity] purposes.”

For good measure, the court says the defendant “[o]n remand . . . may renew his arguments that he is entitled to resentencing under [other later-enacted legislation] in light of our recent decisions in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 [see here] and People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 [see here].”

The court reverses the Fourth District, Division Two, Court of Appeal’s 2-1, partially published opinion. Division Two had disagreed with the Fourth District, Division Three, decision in People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376.

Property wasn’t legally subdivided, Supreme Court rules

In Cox v. City of Oakland, the Supreme Court today interprets the Subdivision Map Act as applied to an old land conveyance of multiple lots.

The court’s unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero holds the description of different lots in a single 1944 conveyance didn’t give separate legal status to each lot despite the conveyance occurring before a 1972 statutory change that now requires local government approval of subdivisions of land into even a small number of lots. “[A] conveyance does not ‘create[ ]’ multiple parcels [under the Act] merely by referring separately to lots of the contiguous property being conveyed,” the court concludes. Instead, the pre-1972 conveyance must have “alienate[d] one portion of an original parcel, . . . creat[ing] a single new parcel comprised of the conveyed portion of property.”

The court says its “interpretation . . . advances the Act’s goals of encouraging orderly community development and preventing undue burdens on the public.”

The court reverses the First District, Division One, belatedly published opinion.

No straight grants this week at this week’s conference, but some interesting actions nonetheless

The Supreme Court didn’t straight grant any cases at yesterday’s conference, but there were some notable rulings, including:

Murder resentencing grant-and-transfer.

The court granted review in another Senate Bill 1437 case, People v. Gray, vacated the unpublished opinion of the Second District, Division One, Court of Appeal, and sent the matter back to the appellate court to reconsider its affirmance of a resentencing petition’s denial “in light of People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451-452.” (Regarding Curiel, see here.) The defendant was sentenced over 40 years ago to life without parole for felony murder after a jury’s true finding of felony-murder special circumstances. The 2018 legislation narrowed felony murder liability and allows for resentencing.

The People conceded in the superior court that the defendant should be resentenced, but the trial judge rejected the concession and Division One, brushing aside the concession, held the special circumstances finding necessarily established the jury had concluded the defendant harbored the intent to kill, a necessary element for felony murder under SB 1437. The Curiel pages cited in the Supreme Court’s order explain what is necessary for a special circumstance finding to have preclusive effect in an SB 1437 resentencing proceeding.

It’s unusual for the Supreme Court to grant-and-transfer for reconsideration in light of authority that was available to the Court of Appeal. Division One’s opinion mentioned Curiel once, concerning a point different than issue preclusion.

Racial Justice Act OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, on a pro per’s habeas corpus petition (filed as a petition for review, but considered a habeas petition by the Supreme Court) in Mitchell v. Superior Court. Cause is to be shown “why the petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel under the Racial Justice Act [see here and here]. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act].)” The Second District, Division Three, had summarily denied the writ of mandate petition the pro per had filed, concluding he “has not made a prima facie showing that he was charged or convicted of a more serious offense or had a longer or more severe sentence imposed as a result of his race, ethnicity, or national origin.”

Fee waiver denial OSC.

The court granted review in Mockett v. Superior Court and sent the case back to the Fourth District, Division Two (which had summarily denied Mockett’s writ petition) with directions to have “the respondent superior court . . . show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted.”

The petition for review argued the superior court improperly denied Mockett’s application to waive fees, payable to that court, for his appeal (see rules 8.100(b), 8.122(c)) of an adverse civil judgment. The petition quoted the superior court’s reason for the denial, “Attorney can advance fees and costs.” Requiring an indigent litigant’s attorney to advance fees seems contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153, 164–165. The petition didn’t mention Isrin.

The Supreme Court’s order doesn’t mention its Isrin opinion, either, but it does say, “The response to the order to show cause should address the application of Government Code section 68632, subdivision (a)(3).” (Link added.) That statute provides a fee waiver application “shall be granted” to persons “receiving public benefits” under any of a variety of different federal and state programs, including food stamps, which Mockett said he receives.

When Mockett submitted his petition for review to the Supreme Court, the court granted his concurrently submitted application for waiver of that court’s fees. That just might be a hint of how the court wants the writ petition to be decided.

Capitol renovation green light. The court denied review in Save Our Capitol! v. Department of General Services. The Third District’s published opinion affirmed the rejection of a challenge to an environmental impact report on proposed substantial changes to California’s capitol. The appellate court based its decision on action taken by the capitol building’s occupants: “after two adverse appellate decisions, and with this third appeal pending, the Legislature decided to exempt the project from further CEQA review.” The exempting legislation “dictates the result in this appeal,” the opinion stated. There’s also considerable discussion about budget bills, trailer bills, and urgency legislation in determining that the exemption doesn’t violate a state constitutional section limiting legislative actions that would authorize certain changes to the capitol.

Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were eight criminal case grant-and-holds:  two more waiting for a decision in People v. Patton (see here), which was argued last month; one more holding for People v. Fletcher (see here); two more waiting for People v. Lopez (see here), the opinion in which was filed today; one more holding for In re Hernandez (see here); and two more on hold for People v. Rhodius (see here).

Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here).

Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc., which was a grant-and-hold (see here) waiting for the October Lemon Law decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (see here), was returned to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Rodriguez. Horvitz & Levy represented the prevailing defendant in Rodriguez and represents the defendant in Stiles.

The court disposed of 10 cases that were holding for the August youth offender parole decision in People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 (see here). Review was dismissed in six and four were sent back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the Williams opinion. And one case that was on hold for decisions in Williams, In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706 (see here), and People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (see here), was returned to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of just Vaquera.

“California High Court Braces for Deportation-Related Turmoil”

Maia Spoto has this detailed piece for Bloomberg Law.

It begins, “California’s Supreme Court is ready to intervene again if the federal government sends immigration enforcement agents to state courthouses. The state judiciary is preparing to defend itself, Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero said, by reviewing ‘what has happened in the past,’ which includes high-profile clashes between former Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye and President Donald Trump’s prior administration over access to justice for migrants.”

But the article is about potential federal-state conflicts in more areas than immigration. It identifies types of cases in which California courts might offer more protection than the feds, such as those with issues in privacy, civil rights, consumer protection, education, and criminal law (including the death penalty).

I’m quoted in the article.

Related:

Chief Justice pledges to protect court access against disruptive federal immigration actions and addresses a wide range of other issues at her annual meeting with the media

Gang enhancement, Subdivision Map Act opinions filing tomorrow

Tomorrow morning, the Supreme Court will file its opinions in two-thirds of the cases argued in November. That might sound like a lot, but there were only three cases on that month’s calendar. Tomorrow’s opinions will be in People v. Lopez and Cox v. City of Oakland (née Crescent Trust v. City of Oakland). (Briefs here; oral argument videos here and here.)

When the court granted review in Lopez in November 2023, it limited the issue to: “Is defendant entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) where he appeals for a second time after his judgment was conditionally reversed and the Court of Appeal issued a limited remand to the trial court to address sentencing issues?” More about the case here.

The Cox opinion is expected to address whether a pre-1972 conveyance by a single deed of a group of fewer than five contiguous lots that are separately described in the deed by reference to lot numbers on a pre-1893 survey map is a “division” of land that “creates” an individual lawful lot for each of the separately described lots in the single deed under the conclusive presumption set forth in Government Code section 66412.6, subdivision (a), of the Subdivision Map Act? The court granted review in July 2023. More about the case here.

These will be the first opinions in the November calendar cases. The opinion in the last case — the death penalty appeal in People v. Hin — should file by February 6. Other argued but undecided cases are the four on the December calendar (opinions due by March 3, except for the death penalty appeal in People v. McGhee, in which the opinion isn’t due until April 3 because of post-argument briefing) and the three on the January calendar (opinions due by April 7, although there’s a pending motion in People v. Jasso to pause the 90-day clock for additional briefing).

The Lopez and Cox opinions can be viewed tomorrow starting at 10:00 a.m.

The Chief Justice on remote arguments, issue percolation, rescue missions, and opinion length [Updated with photo]

At her meeting last week with the media, Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero answered questions about such things as immigration arrests in courthouses, the Los Angeles fires, artificial intelligence, and the judiciary’s budget. (See here.) But some of her answers included tidbits of interest to appellate practitioners.

Arguing remotely

In responding to an inquiry about remote work habits of the justices and court staff, the Chief Justice segued to the court’s post-pandemic policy of giving counsel the option of appearing for oral argument by video. (See here and here.) She called the policy a positive one, but she noted, “As an advocate, I probably would be in person if I could. I think it’s more effective.”

Since the pandemic, all seven justices are usually present in the courtroom for oral arguments, but there are exceptions. (E.g., here and here.)

When the court denies review of cases with review-worthy issues

Guerrero noted the most common reasons for granting review of case: when the Courts of Appeal are split on an issue or there’s an issue of statewide importance. (See rule 8.500(b)(1).) But, she added, the court doesn’t grant review in all cases fitting that description.

At the court’s regular conferences, Guerrero said the justices will “talk about [cases] that aren’t the correct vehicle” for deciding issues. “For a variety of reasons we may not accept that case, but we’ll deny but watch” and “keep tracking,” she explained. That’s why the court “might not automatically grant [review] the first time around.”

(Related: The Supreme Court doesn’t decide all important issues; Wait for it: issue percolation, right vehicles, and legislative inaction; see, e.g., here.)

Rescue missions

Chief Justice Guerrero at her annual meeting with the press, possibly answering my question about rescue missions

The Chief Justice repeated the axiom that the Supreme Court is “not a court of error correction.” “It’s not for us to second guess the work of the Court of Appeal or try to figure out what we would have done if we were them or the trial court,” she said. However, she did allow that the court will occasionally engage in “rescue missions,” that is a review grant that wouldn’t “fit within the normal requirements” and for reasons “outside of the rules” simply to “help somebody.” (Related: “Rescue missions”: the Supreme Court sometimes is an error-correction body; see also former Justice Edward Panelli’s oral history, which Guerrero mentioned, in 17 California Legal History (2022) 403, 561 [“to suggest that we wouldn’t do what we used to call a rescue mission every now [and then] wouldn’t be correct, because sometimes you saw the error was so egregious that you just felt you really can’t live with it. So you would grant a case that really didn’t meet the [rule] standards.”])

Although agreeing rescue missions exist, Guerrero was decidedly lukewarm personally on the concept. She said, “I don’t know that I like that term.” And she added, “I understand the sentiment and sometimes I agree with it, but in my mind there are all kinds of cases where we feel bad for the parties and we would want to rescue in some sense a lot of people and it doesn’t seem fair to sometimes pick one case to rescue.” But she also admitted, “I can’t say I’ve always been consistent; . . . there [are] good reasons for it in some cases.” (For possible rescue mission examples, see here and here.)

Opinion length

Guerrero stressed the importance of the press informing the public about individual court rulings. In that context, she commented that, although opinions are readily available to the public, “in some cases, they’re a little too long for the lay person to get through.” Some might say that some court opinions are too long, period.

Chief Justice pledges to protect court access against disruptive federal immigration actions and addresses a wide range of other issues at her annual meeting with the media [Updated]

Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero said “we would take action” if there are “any attempts . . . to prevent people from accessing the court,” including attempts by federal immigration agents during the next administration beginning tomorrow. Responding to questions last week at her second annual meeting with a number of reporters, a meeting attended by At The Lectern, the Chief Justice sounded less combative on the issue than her predecessor, but was firm in stating her intent to thwart actions that would “disrupt” the public’s right to physically attend judicial proceedings.

During the previous federal administration, then-Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye was a frequent critic of federal immigration actions in California’s courthouses that she said interfered with the administration of justice. Among many other public statements, Cantil-Sakauye wrote to the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security accusing immigration agents of “stalking undocumented immigrants in our courthouses to make arrests” and asserting that the courts “should not be used as bait.” Courthouse immigration arrests “not only compromise our core value of fairness,” the letter stated, “but they undermine the judiciary’s ability to provide equal access to justice.” (See also here, here, here, here, here, and here.)

Chief Justice Guerrero said that immigration issues “are top of mind for anyone who watches the news” and that “certainly we’re aware of the surrounding events,” but also that “it’s difficult to predict what may happen even looking at past practices.” She knows that the other branches of state government have already acted to counter anticipated adverse federal actions, but said “Trump-proof” “is not a term that I would use for the judicial branch.” Guerrero claimed that she is “not trying to pick fights with anybody” and that “we don’t seek to interfere in terms of federal enforcement.” Nonetheless, she stated, “we need to be prepared for any interruptions in court proceedings,” and she assured, “I am responsible for the administration of the courts and insuring that the public has the ability — whether you’re a witness, a victim, [or] one of the parties — to be able to freely go into court.”

In 2019, the Legislature — invoking California’s “reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to protect their proceedings, as well as the obligation under the United States Constitution to preserve California’s republican form of government” (Assembly Bill 668) — added a statute (Civ. Code section 43.54) providing, “A person shall not be subject to civil arrest in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse,” other than “arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant.” (See here.)

Additionally, a federal district court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting officers from making civil immigration arrests at the federal courthouse. (Velazquez-Hernandez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (S.D. Cal. 2020) 500 F.Supp.3d 1132.) The court said the arrests “deter[ ] parties and witnesses from coming to court, instill[ ] fear, [are] inconsistent with the decorum of the court, and degrade[ ] the administration of justice.”

Guerrero mentioned both the legislation and the federal decision.

Other Issues. During her hour-long session, also attended by Judicial Council Administrative Director Shelley Curran, the Chief Justice answered questions on a variety of other topics, including:

Remote work at the Supreme Court

Guerrero disclosed that some justices — including she herself — sometimes participate remotely at the Supreme Court’s regular conferences to decide what cases the court will hear. She admitted she likes to see everyone in person, but said that all justices “are actively involved whether they’re in person or on the phone or on video conference” and that she doesn’t think remote conferencing “impairs the dialogue that we have.”

Remote conferencing gives the justices “flexibility,” the Chief Justice said, and “we give our staff the same [remote work] flexibility.” She said that each justice runs their own individual chambers, but noted the court has a policy of expecting staff to be in person for at least two days a week.

The Los Angeles fires and emergency preparedness

Noting that a “significant” number “of judicial officers and court staff . . . have lost their homes [in the recent Los Angeles-area fires], [both] on the trial court and the appellate court,” Guerrero said “our heart goes out to all of our court family that’s been impacted by this.”

The Chief Justice also noted that emergency preparedness in general “is something that Shelley and I have discussed from day one.” She specified “physical safety for our judicial officers” and “cyber security issues” as some areas of concern, but said “it’s difficult to predict all of the bad things that could happen.”

Criticism of the courts

Guerrero said “it’s important for the public to be able to criticize the work of all branches of government, including the judiciary,” but she doesn’t like politicizing the criticism, such as when judges are associated with the governor or president who has appointed them “in a way that suggests that the decision will automatically reflect a certain outcome.” She thinks that people might not “understand fully that we’re not here to make policy and make decisions based on what we think the outcome should be or should not be based on our own political preferences.”

Update:

Media coverage of the Chief Justice’s meeting includes:

Chief Justice won’t ‘pick a fight’ with Trump, would act if courts affected, by Malcolm Maclachlan in the Daily Journal

California’s Chief Justice Starts Third Year With Questions About Fires, Trump and AI, by Cheryl Miller in The Recorder

California Chief Justice Says Social Media Harms Civic Discourse, by Isaiah Poritz for Bloomberg

Calif.’s Chief Justice On Preparing For Trump, AI, by Bonnie Eslinger for Law360

Fire Aid for L.A. Judges Is Limited Under Ethics Rules on Gifts, by Maia Spoto for Bloomberg

This week’s conference — Part III

Yes, there was a lot of action at this week’s Supreme Court conference, a double one. This is the third and final part of a summary of some highlights. Parts I and II are here and here.

DUI murder dissenting vote. The court denied review in People v. Woodfill, but Justice Goodwin Liu recorded a vote to hear the case. The Fourth District, Division One, unpublished opinion affirmed a second degree murder conviction of the defendant for killing a pedestrian while drunk driving. The defendant unsuccessfully advanced three points as prejudicial error: (1) the refusal to modify a jury instruction about implied malice, (2) the failure to sua sponte instruct on either vehicular manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and (3) allowing the People to show the jury a photograph of the victim while she was alive. Justice Liu didn’t explain his vote, so it’s not clear which issue or issues attracted his attention. (There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled.) If I had to guess, I’d say it was issue number one. In October, Justice Liu signed on to an extended concurring statement by Justice Evans when the court denied review in another vehicular homicide case involving implied malice murder. (See here.) The issue continues to percolate below. (See: Wait for it: issue percolation, right vehicles, and legislative inaction.)

More dissenting votes for review about youth offender parole denial.  As in People v. Celis (reported about in Part II), Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Perez, another unpublished opinion — this one by the Second District, Division Seven — rejecting constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26.

COVID vaccine refusal. The court denied review in Bedard v. City of Los Angeles. The Second District, Division Three, published opinion upheld the firing of a police officer for refusing to comply with a 2021 requirement that all city employees be vaccinated against COVID or apply for a medical or religious exemption. The opinion stated that the plaintiff’s “refusal to become vaccinated placed the public and her coworkers at risk of harm on a daily basis.”

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