Supreme Court flunks alternative-to-bar-exam pathway

The Supreme Court today rejected a proposal that would have allowed prospective lawyers to bypass the traditional bar exam as a way to become licensed attorneys. The court’s unanimous order described the Alternative Pathway plan as having bar applicants “engage in a period of supervised practice and generate a portfolio of work product while advising and representing actual clients” (a portfolio that “would be subsequently graded by a special committee to determine whether the applicant has demonstrated the minimum competence to practice law”) and also “pass up to two performance tests.” The plan was submitted by a working group comprised of five members who dissented from recommendations made by the State Bar’s Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of the Bar Exam.

The court said the proposal runs afoul of current statutory law and also “implicates an array of ethical and practical problems that would compromise the [Portfolio Bar Examination’s] fairness, validity, and reliability as a measure of an applicant’s competence.” Among other things, the order says the supervision component isn’t good because it “will introduce variance in the assessed work product dependent on the aptitudes of the supervisor rather than the applicant.”

The order also, however, approved with modifications most of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s majority recommendations, including the development of “a California-specific bar examination.” One approved recommendation calls for a test “that is fair, equitable, and minimizes disparate performance impacts based on race, gender, ethnicity, disability, and other immutable characteristics.” The court declined to adopt a proposal for reciprocity licensing of attorneys from other jurisdictions.

By a separate letter from the court’s Clerk/Executive Officer Jorge Navarrete, the court also today turned down a request by law school deans to further lower the bar exam’s passing score.

The court has apparently not yet ruled on a State Bar proposal — resubmitted six days ago — to proceed with a new bar exam written by Kaplan Exam Services.

Related:

Cheryl Miller reports for The Recorder.

Supreme Court again postpones bar exam, lowers passing score, and directs temporary provisional licensing for 2020 grads

“California Supreme Court Rejects State Bar’s Initial Plan for New Bar Exam”

The 2023-2024 term in numbers — Part 2 [Updated to fix an omission]

Last week, we offered some statistics for the Supreme Court’s 2023-2024 term (from September 1, 2023 to August 31, 2024), discussing data related to actions taken at the court’s conferences (also here). Today, we talk about the court’s opinions.

The court issued 58 opinions, slightly up from the previous term’s 55. 26 of the 58 opinions were in criminal cases, including 5 death penalty appeals; the other 32 were in civil cases.

The court was still generally harmonious, just not as much as during the 2022-2023 term. There was less agreement in criminal cases than in civil matters.

All seven justices concurred in 46 decisions (17 of the 26 criminal and 29 of the 32 civil), including 3 cases where two of the seven issued a concurring opinion and 1 case with a five-justice separate concurrence. That’s 79 percent of the court’s opinions. There were two other opinions with no dissent, but one justice didn’t sign the court’s opinion and filed a concurring opinion (in one case, joined by two of the six justices who did sign the court’s opinion). Adding those two cases yields an 83 percent no-dissent rate. In the previous term, the seven-justice-opinion rate was 91 percent and the no-dissent rate was 93 percent.

There were 10 decisions with dissents, 8 in criminal cases and 2 in civil cases. Only one was a 4-3 decision (a criminal case), 8 (6 criminal and 2 civil) were 5-2 cases (including three matters that also featured a two-justice or one-justice separate concurrence), and 1 (a criminal case) was a 6-1 decision. 3 of the 5 death penalty appeals had 5-2 splits; the other 2 were unanimous.

Here are individual justice statistics:

Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero wrote 13 opinions for the court (7 criminal, including two death penalty cases; 6 civil). All of the civil opinions were 7-0, as were 5 of the criminal. 2 were 5-2 decisions, including one where there was also a separate concurrence. She also authored one dissent, signed another justice’s dissent, and joined a separate concurring opinion. (See: Chief Justice Guerrero’s dissent this week is a novelty and here.)

Justice Carol Corrigan wrote 8 opinions for the court (4 criminal, including one death penalty case; 4 civil). Her civil opinions were all 7-0 opinions, with one including a two-justice concurrence. 1 of her criminal opinions was 4-3, 2 were 5-2 (including her death penalty opinion), and 1 garnered all her colleagues’ signatures but with a five-justice separate concurring opinion. She wrote one concurring opinion (in a criminal case) and signed 2 other concurrences (1 criminal and 1 civil).

Justice Goodwin Liu wrote 8 opinions for the court (3 criminal; 5 civil). All were 7-0 decisions. He also authored 5 dissents (4 criminal, including 2 in death penalty cases; 1 civil) and 2 concurring opinions (both criminal). He signed 3 other dissents and one other concurrence, all in criminal cases.

Justice Leondra Kruger wrote 10 opinions for the court (4 criminal, including one death penalty case; 6 civil). All her civil opinions were 7-0. Two of the criminal opinions were signed by all the justices, although one had a two-justice concurrence. The other two criminal decisions, including the death penalty opinion, were 5-2. She also wrote one concurring and dissenting opinion (in a criminal case) and 3 concurring opinions (all in civil cases). She signed a concurring opinion in a criminal case.

Justice Joshua Groban wrote 6 opinions for the court (3 criminal and 3 civil). 5 of the 6 were 7-0 decisions. One (in a criminal case) was a 6-0 opinion with a one-justice concurrence. He wrote 2 dissents (1 criminal and 1 civil) and 2 concurrences (also 1 criminal and 1 civil). He signed three concurring opinions (1 criminal; 2 civil).

Justice Martin Jenkins wrote 5 opinions for the court (2 criminal and 3 civil). 1 criminal and 2 civil opinions were 7-0 decisions. 1 criminal opinion was 6-1 and 1 civil opinion was 5-2 with a two-justice concurrence. He wrote no separate opinions, but signed 2 concurring opinions (1 criminal; 1 civil) and 1 concurring and dissenting opinion (in a criminal case).

Justice Kelli Evans wrote 8 opinions for the court (3 criminal, including one death penalty case; 5 civil). Her criminal opinions were all 7-0 opinions, with one including a two-justice concurrence that she herself signed. 3 of her civil opinions were 7-0 decisions, one was a 6-0 decision with a three-justice concurrence, and one was a 5-2 decision with a two-justice concurrence. [October 10 update: I neglected to note that Justice Evans also authored 5 separate opinions, all in criminal cases (4 dissents and 1 concurrence) and that she signed 2 concurring opinions (both in criminal cases, including the one concurring in the opinion she wrote for the court) and 2 dissents (1 criminal and 1 civil).]

Related:

The 2022-2023 term in numbers — Part 2, and the Supreme Court’s year in review

U.S. Supreme Court passes on two California Supreme Court cases [Updated with a third case]

On the first Monday in October, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied certiorari of two California Supreme Court opinions:

Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939 (cert. denied here) — a health care agent of a skilled nursing facility resident can’t agree on the resident’s behalf to arbitrate negligence claims against the facility. (See here.)

Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal.5th 680 (cert. denied here) — even though “[i]mplied easements are not favored in the law,” an easement must be recognized when there is “clear evidence” of a prior intent to allow a particular use, even when “the nature of the easement effectively precludes the property owners from making most practical uses of the easement area.” (See here.)

[October 8 update: appellate lawyer Bob Bacon points out that the U.S. Supreme Court also denied cert. in People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 — death penalty affirmed while rejecting argument that evidence should have been suppressed because the police exceeded the scope of two search warrants. (See here.)]

Related:

Reviews of California Supreme Court cases at prior U.S. Supreme Court terms — 2020 term, 2021 term, 2022 term, 2023 term

Oral argument outreach session in Fresno, no conference, this week [Updated]

On Wednesday, the court will be hearing oral arguments on its October calendar. It will be one of the court’s occasional special outreach sessions on the road. This one will be in Fresno with — according to Blaine Corren’s news release — students from 10 high schools, one elementary school, and one law school in attendance. It will be the first time the court is sitting in Fresno since 2010.

The arguments will be live streamed. Opinions in the cases should file by January 6.

Because of the oral arguments, the court will not be conferencing (also here) this week and there will be a double conference next week.

[October 9 update: Dylan Gonzales reports on the outreach session for The Business Journal.]

Related:

Supreme Court holds special outreach session in San Diego [Photos]

The 2023-2024 term in numbers — Part 1

The Supreme Court doesn’t have an official term, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, but September 1 to August 31 is a logical unofficial term because the court doesn’t hear oral arguments in July or August and, due to the 90-day rule, opinions in cases argued before the summer hiatus normally file by the end of August.

As we did a year ago (here and here), we present a rare (for us) quantitative analysis of the court. Like last year, we’ll look at the most recently completed term it in two parts. Today, we’re looking at numbers for categories other than those relating to the court’s opinions. And, speaking of unofficial, that’s what the numbers are. They were gathered by reviewing blog posts about the court’s conferences during the term. Miscounting by me is always a possibility.

Straight Grants

There were 35 straight grants (down from 46 the previous term), 22 in civil cases and 13 in criminal cases. Included in the criminal category are technically civil but criminally related matters, such as habeas corpus and Sexually Violent Predators Act cases. Included as a straight grant is an agreement by the court to answer a question of California law referred by the Ninth Circuit.

Grant-and-Holds

The court granted-and-held 193 criminal cases and 45 civil cases. (It was 177 and 32 for the 2022-2023 term.)

Depublications

The court depublished just five Court of Appeal opinions, three in civil cases and two in criminal cases. (There were 15 depublications — mostly in civil cases — in the 2022-2023 term.) Not counted are opinions depublished by a Supreme Court grant-and-transfer order directing the Court of Appeal to vacate its prior opinion (see here).

The court’s own term review (see here) reports seven depublications. I’m not sure why there’s a discrepancy; perhaps the court’s review does count orders to vacate.

Recorded Dissents

Straight grants might have been down, but not for lack of effort by some justices. Justices recorded votes dissenting from denials of petitions for review or for habeas corpus 66 times, twice as many as in the 2022-2023 term. Most of the dissenting votes — 58 — were in criminal cases.

Four cases had three votes for review. In 18 other cases there were two votes for review. A number of the two-justice dissenting votes were by Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans in youth offender parole cases, a trend that is continuing this term (see here).

Here is the tally of dissenting votes by justice:

  • Justice Goodwin Liu: 25 dissenting votes (23 in criminal cases; 2 in civil cases).
  • Justice Kelli Evans: 25 dissenting votes (22 in criminal cases; 3 in civil cases).
  • Justice Joshua Groban: 10 dissenting votes (8 in criminal cases; 2 in civil cases).
  • Justice Martin Jenkins: 5 dissenting votes (all in criminal cases).
  • Justice Leondra Kruger: 1 dissenting vote (in a civil case).
  • Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero and Justice Carol Corrigan didn’t record any dissenting votes.

Separate Statements

Occasionally, a justice will publish a separate statement when the court denies review. There were nine of those statements during the term.

  • Justice Groban wrote one statement in dissent and three concurring. Justices Liu and Evans signed the dissent and two of the concurrences. One concurring statement was a solo effort.
  • Justice Evans wrote one dissenting statement and two concurring. Justice Liu signed all three of Justice Evans’s separate statements and Justice Groban joined in one of the concurrences.
  • Justice Liu — who in 2015 revived the separate statement practice — wrote two separate statements, one dissenting and one concurring. Justice Evans signed both and Justice Groban joined the dissent.

Supreme Court grants review in three criminal cases [Updated]

The Supreme Court granted review in three criminal cases at its conference yesterday. Here’s information about those grants and some other actions:

Resentencing procedure: Six-justice concurring statement about own-motion resentencing procedure.

Resisting an officer with an unloaded gun. The court granted review in People v. Morgan to (probably) decide whether the crime of “resist[ing]” an officer “by the use of force or violence” (Penal Code section 69(a)) can be committed by pointing an unloaded gun at the officer and pulling the trigger if the officer doesn’t know the weapon is not loaded. The First District, Division One, Court of Appeal published opinion said “yes,” rejecting the defendant’s argument that an assault can’t be committed with an unloaded gun, that assault is a necessarily included lesser offense of resistance under section 69, and that he therefore couldn’t be convicted of the greater offense. Division One concluded, “resisting an officer by ‘force or violence’ under section 69, subdivision (a) does not require either a threshold quantum of force or violence, or the use of force or violence ‘upon the person of’ the officer.” We say review was granted “probably,” but not definitely, to decide the resisting-an-officer issue because the appellate court’s opinion also addressed two sentencing issues, including one that is before the court in People v. Wiley (see here). The court hasn’t limited the issues, but we haven’t seen the petition for review, which might have raised only one issue. We should know more tomorrow when we see court staff’s summary of the issue(s).

[October 4 update: Here’s the issue as summarized by court staff — “Is assault (Pen. Code, § 240) a necessarily included lesser offense of resisting an executive officer by force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69, subd. (a))?”]

Scope of resentencing hearing. Another review grant was in People v. Esquivias. Ruling on a habeas corpus petition, the superior court struck firearms sentence enhancements based on the retroactive application of new legislation, but it declined to revisit the defendant’s convictions based on other new statutes, including Assembly Bill No. 333, which narrowed criminal liability for gang-related activities. In a published opinion, the Second District, Division Two, affirmed, concluding that the “[d]efendant’s proffered ‘revisit-any-on-habeas, revisit-all-on-habeas’ rule is inconsistent with . . . fundamental tenets of habeas review, is inconsistent with our Legislature’s express intent to make only certain new laws fully retroactive, and is likely to discourage trial courts from revisiting any part of a sentence on habeas—thereby harming defendants.” The defendant relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 (see here) and People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (see here).

[October 4 update: Here’s the issue as summarized by court staff — “Does the issuance of an order to show cause to review one aspect of a defendant’s sentence in habeas corpus proceedings render applicable all ameliorative laws taking effect after the defendant’s judgment became final?”]

Presentence credits. The court also agreed to hear People v. Cofer to resolve another intra-district split of authority. The Sixth District’s 2-1 published opinion held, “when a defendant is sentenced concurrently at a single hearing to resolve multiple cases that were not previously the subject of a judgment of conviction or probationary disposition, Penal Code section 2900.5 requires the trial court to apply presentence credits for all periods of actual custody toward all of those concurrent sentences.” (Link added.) The ruling is contrary to the earlier Sixth District decision in People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67, in which the Supreme Court denied review. Unlike other appellate courts that have purported to “overrule” or “disapprove” prior opinions from the same court (see, e.g., here and here), the Cofer opinion only “disagree[s] with Jacobs.” A dissenting justice “disagree[d] . . . with the majority’s conviction that we may bend Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (b) to our own sense of what is fair and reasonable—without either legislative action or the California Supreme Court’s reconsideration of its own more restrictive interpretations of the legislative intent.” (Footnote omitted.)

[October 4 update: Here’s the issue as summarized by court staff — “When a defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms on multiple cases jointly resolved at a single hearing, does Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (b) entitle the defendant to duplicative presentence custody credits for time spent in custody on one or more of the cases, but not others?”]

Another Racial Justice Act grant-and-transfer. The court granted review in In re Davis and sent the case back to the Second District, Division Five, which had summarily denied the habeas corpus petition in the case. Division Five is to issue an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, “why the petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the disclosure of discovery and the appointment of counsel under the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, §§ 745, subd. (d), 1473, subd. (e) [providing for the disclosure of discovery upon a showing of good cause and appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts that would establish a violation of the Racial Justice Act]), in light of data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing under the Three Strikes law.” These RJA grant-and-transfers are becoming regular occurrences. (See here.)

Racial Justice Act OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in the pro per’s habeas corpus petition in In re Semien. The issue to be decided is whether the petitioner is “entitled to relief under Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a) based on his claims that the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against the sole Black juror on the jury venire, and the prosecutor’s statements justifying the challenge, violated the Racial Justice Act.” (See also Davis, directly above.)

Kill-zone OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable before the Second District, Division Two, in the pro per’s habeas corpus petition in In re Wroten. Cause is to be shown “why relief should not be granted on the ground petitioner’s attempted murder conviction in count five is invalid pursuant to People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 and People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176.” Canizales and Mumin both involved the requirements for liability under what is known as the kill-zone theory, invoked when a defendant is sought to be convicted of attempted murder of someone who was not a primary target. (See here and here.) Division Two summarily denied a Wroten habeas corpus petition a year ago.

Capital habeas dissenting votes. The court denied review in In re Bramit, but Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans recorded dissenting votes. The Fourth District, Division Two, had dismissed an appeal from a superior court denial of a prisoner’s capital habeas corpus petition. The petition was originally filed in the Supreme Court, but the court transferred the petition to the superior court six years ago under Penal Code section 1509(a), enacted by Proposition 66.  (See here and here.)  Division Two ruled, “At the time appellant filed his appeal he was no longer in custody pursuant to a judgment of death, so he is not entitled to appeal pursuant to Penal Code section 1509.1.” (Link added.) It is unclear from online dockets why the defendant is no longer under a judgment of death, nor what issue or issues attracted the dissenting votes. Fifteen years ago the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s death sentence for a 1994 murder. (People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221.)

More dissenting votes for review about youth offender parole denial. Justices Liu and Evans also recorded dissenting votes from the denials of review in People v. Hout and People v. Hughes. Unpublished decisions by Second District Divisions Five and Six, respectively, rejected constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26. In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed (see herehereherehereherehere, here, and here). It seems unlikely the court will ever grant review in any such case unless a Court of Appeal goes against the tide and adopts a defense cruel-or-unusual argument. (See: The Supreme Court doesn’t decide all important issues.)

Murder resentencing dissenting vote. Justice Evans also dissented from the denial of review in People v. Rodriguez, where a Fifth District unpublished opinion affirmed the denial of a defendant’s petition to be resentenced under Senate Bill 1437, 2018 legislation that limited liability for felony murder and eliminated it for murder under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine.  The appellate court concluded “substantial evidence supports the [superior] court’s finding that appellant would be found guilty of murder under the aiding and abetting implied malice murder theory.” That opinion said it didn’t matter whether the defendant knew another person was going to shoot and kill the victim because there was evidence that the “appellant knew she was aiding, intended to aid, and did aid a life-endangering act—the violent group beating of one person where dangerous weapons were used—with conscious disregard for human life.” (Related: see here and here.)

ICWA grant-and-transfer. The court granted review in In re J.S. and sent the case back to the Second District, Division Four, for reconsideration in light of the August decision in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, where the Supreme Court held an inadequate investigation under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and complementary California statutes requires automatic reversal and a remand for an appropriate inquiry (see here). The Division Four unpublished opinion, on the other hand, concluded that any failure of inquiry was harmless.

Undisclosed hospital fee grant-and-hold. Salami v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center is another grant-and-hold for Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System (see here and here), which will be argued next week and which is expected to decide whether a hospital has a duty to disclose emergency room fees to patients beyond its statutory duty to make its chargemaster publicly available. In Salami, the Second District, Division Six, belatedly published opinion agreed with and quoted the Fourth District, Division Three, decision in Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 166, also a Capito grant-and-hold (see here), in concluding, “ ‘[a] hospital’s duty to list, post, write down, or discuss fees it may or may not charge an emergency room patient starts and ends with its duty to list prices in the chargemaster.’ ” “It is not up to this court to disturb the balance rulemakers have struck,” the court added.

Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were four criminal case grant-and-holds:  one each waiting for decisions in People v. Patton (see here), People v. Lopez (see here), People v. Rhodius (see here), and People v. Montgomery (see here).

Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here). Thirteen former grant-and-holds were disposed of. Five were waiting for the August restitution decision in People v. McCune (2024) 16 Cal.5th 980 (see here) — the court dismissed review in three and returned the other two to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of McCune. Eight cases on hold for another August decision — People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, which concerned the standard of review for sentencing error (see here) — were sent back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Lynch.

Six-justice concurring statement about own-motion resentencing procedure

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Baker v. Superior Court, but six justices filed a concurring statement warning a superior court against limiting defendants’ ability to seek resentencing on a judge’s own motion.

Penal Code section 1172.1 allows a court “on its own motion . . . [to] recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced.” A court can do so on the “recommendation” of various entities, such as a district attorney or the secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings, but the statute says “[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.”

According to the separate statement, authored by Justice Kelli Evans and signed by the rest of the court except for Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero, the writ petition in the case complained “that the San Mateo County Superior Court enacted, as an invalid local rule, a ‘policy’ of blanket denials of defendant-initiated section 1172.1 petitions.”

Denial of review was appropriate, the six justices said, because “[t]he record here is, at best, ambiguous that respondent court adopted a policy that interfered with sentencing judges’ authority to grant such relief on their own motion.”

But the superior court did not get off completely free. The statement goes on to say, “to the extent the superior court established a policy simply not to review any Penal Code section 1172.1 petitions at all, such policy would contravene legislative mandates.” The justices said, “Defendants, although not expressly permitted to initiate recall and resentencing themselves, may nonetheless be able to ‘invite’ the court to exercise its discretionary powers,” and they concluded, “any policy that would interfere with a sitting sentencing judge’s ability to receive notice of, or to act upon, a defendant-initiated invitation to recall and resentence under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) would raise significant concerns.”

The separate statement provides the view of a super majority of the Supreme Court about a legal issue. However, because the Court of Appeal (the First District, Division Four) summarily denied the writ petition and thus didn’t issue any opinion in the case, it’s unclear how available that statement will be to the bench and bar. (See here.)

Supreme Court’s year in review

The Judicial Council public affairs folks today published a review of the Supreme Court’s 2023-2024 term (i.e., from September 2023 through August 2024). The report’s theme is that, after a year of transition with a new Chief Justice and Associate justice (see here), the most recent completed term “reflected stability and focus on the work of the court.”

In addition to numbers (e.g., there were 58 opinions; 32 in civil cases, 21 in non-capital criminal cases, and 5 in death penalty appeals), the review noted other important events:

  • Hearing some oral arguments in Los Angeles for the first time in four years. (See here.)
  • “Strengthening State Bar Protections.” The court “approved measures to further guard against conflicts of interest involving members of the State Bar Board of Trustees and the State Bar Court” and the Chief Justice “approved an updated and amended conflict of interest code for the Board of Trustees.” (See here.)
  • Former Justice Edward Panelli’s death. (See here and here.)
  • “High-profile Cases”: Castellanos v. State of California (see here), Legislature v. Weber (see here), Another Planet Entertainment v. Vigilant Insurance Co. (see here), People v. Hardin (see here), In re Dezi C. (see here), and Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of the University of California (see here).

There will be an At The Lectern review in the near future. (Last term’s review, in two parts, is here and here.)

New law requests Chief Justice to sign California apology for slavery

New legislation asks Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero to sign California’s “Apology for the Perpetration of Gross Human Rights Violations and Crimes Against Humanity, with special consideration for African Slaves and their Descendants.” Other signatories requested by the law — Assembly Bill 3089 — are Governor Gavin Newsom, Assembly Speaker Robert Rivas, and Senate President Pro Tem Mike McGuire.

Newsom signed the apology after approving the bill. A Judicial Council spokesperson says the Legislature has not yet contacted the Chief Justice. It’s not known if the Speaker and the President Pro Tem have signed the apology.

AB 3089 — a product of the Task Force to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African Americans, with a Special Consideration for African Americans Who are Descendants of Persons Enslaved in the United States (see here) — provides that “California recognizes and accepts responsibility for all of the harms and atrocities committed by the state, its representatives thereof, and entities under its jurisdiction who promoted, facilitated, enforced, and permitted the institution of chattel slavery and the enduring legacy of ongoing badges and incidents from which the systemic structures of discrimination have come to exist.”

Among the bill’s many legislative findings are statements that “[t]he California Supreme Court enforced fugitive slave laws until 1865, stating that the antislavery law in the California Constitution was merely a ‘declaration of a principle’ ” (see In re Perkins (1852) 2 Cal. 424, 456) and that “California courts prevented Black citizens from testifying in legal proceedings against a white person” (see People v. Hall (1854) 4 Cal. 399).

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