In People v. Franklin, the Supreme Court affirms a sentence of 25 years to life for murder committed by a juvenile. In the process, however, the court extends a constitutional protection for certain defendants convicted of crimes committed when they were minors and establishes a new right to a sentencing hearing even when a particular constitutionally appropriate sentence is mandatory.
Based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that precludes automatic life-without-parole sentences for juvenile crimes, the state high court held four years ago that the constitution also proscribes mandatory sentences for nonhomicide offenses that are the “functional equivalent” of life without parole, like the 110-years-to-life term imposed in the case that was before it. Today, in a 6-1 opinion authored by Justice Goodwin Liu, the court holds that the “functional equivalent” rule applies to homicide offenses as well.
The Franklin defendant’s original mandatory sentence made him ineligible for parole for 50 years, but the court doesn’t analyze that sentence under the “functional equivalent” test because intervening legislation reduced his parole eligibility to 25 years. The court does conclude, however, that delaying parole eligibility for 25 years, when the defendant is 41 years old, is not functionally equivalent to life without parole. It does so even though the defendant did not argue to the contrary.
Besides having his sentence reduced according to the new legislation, the defendant receives some additional relief. The legislation provides that the Board of Parole Hearings “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity.” The court remands the case to the trial court “for a determination of whether Franklin was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.”
Justice Kathryn Werdegar writes a concurring and dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s remand decision. She objects to imposing “a new, judicially created, extra statutory procedure entitling [youthful] offenders to a type of penalty phase trial, replete with opposing experts and family members and friends, subject to cross-examination, testifying to the offender’s youthful immaturity.”
The court mostly affirms a decision by the First District, Division Three, Court of Appeal. (The Court of Appeal had affirmed the legislatively reduced 25-years-to-life sentence, but did not afford the possibility of an additional hearing to make a better record for a future parole hearing.)