July 24, 2010

Summary of July 21, 2010 conference report for civil cases

It is our intention to summarize on a weekly basis the Court’s actions on petitions for review in civil cases. We will list those civil cases in which (1) review has been granted (not including grant-and-transfers), (2) review has been denied but one or more justices has voted for review, (3) the Court has ordered depublished an opinion of the Court of Appeal, or (4) the Court has denied a Court of Appeal’s publication request.

The following is the summary of such actions from the Court’s conference on Wednesday, July 21, 2010:

Review Granted

Shalant v. Girardi, S182629—Review Granted—July 21, 2010
When a vexatious litigant subject to a pre-filing order files a lawsuit while represented by counsel, but counsel substitutes out or is otherwise relieved, may the litigant proceed in propria persona without first obtaining the approval of the presiding judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7.
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division One, held that: (1) the vexatious litigant did not violate the pre-filing order, and (2) a pre-filing order issued pursuant to the statute authorizing the issuance of a pre-filing order that prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in propria persona without permission of the presiding judge governs only the initiation of a lawsuit, not actions taken during the prosecution of the litigation.

Review Denied (with dissenting justice)

Franklin Mint v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, S183545—Review Denied [Moreno, J. voting for review]—July 21, 2010
Memorabilia company brought action against law firm and attorney for malicious prosecution, based on underlying lawsuit against memorabilia company for false advertising and trademark dilution under Lanham Act.
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four, held that: (1) the attorneys’ argument that deceased princess had used her name and likeness as a trademark was not tenable; (2) the argument that princess’s name and likeness had acquired secondary meaning referring to charitable services was not tenable; (3) the argument that princess’s name did not require secondary meaning for trademark protection was not tenable; (4) the argument that celebrity names did not require secondary meaning to support trademark dilution claims was not tenable; (5) a federal court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the underlying trademark dilution claim did not establish probable cause; (6) the argument that advertisements stated that all proceeds from merchandise depicting princess would be donated was not tenable; (7) the argument that an advertisement stating that “all proceeds” would be donated was literally false was not tenable; and (8) the argument that advertisements misled customers to believe a portion of proceeds would be donated was not tenable.

Depublished

None.

Court of Appeal Publication Request Denied

None.

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