At its weekly conference yesterday, the Supreme Court ruled on only 76 matters, 59 if you don’t count disposals of previous grant-and-hold cases. Relatively, that’s a small number. But there were notable actions, including:
Felony murder resentencing. Taking yet another Senate Bill 1437 case, the court agreed to decide People v. Morris. A 2-1 published opinion by the Fourth District, Division Three, Court of Appeal applied the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (see here) and affirmed the summary denial of a petition to resentence the defendant who was convicted of first degree murder in 2013. The majority held the 2018 legislation that limited liability for felony murder didn’t help the defendant because “[t]he jury instructions and jury verdicts in this case establish the jury necessarily concluded defendant possessed an intent to kill during the commission of the underlying felonies and aided and abetted the actual killer in committing those felonies.” (Emphasis added.) The dissent, on the other hand, asserts the prosecution must establish not only an intent to kill, but also that “the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder.” (Original emphasis.) Morris joins a substantial number of other decided or pending SB 1437 cases. In fact, the Supreme Court filed an SB 1437 opinion just last week. (See also here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.)
[July 19 update: Here’s the issue as summarized by court staff — “Did the trial court correctly deny defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the actus reus of first degree felony murder requires that a defendant who is not the actual killer need only aid in the underlying felony and not in the killing itself (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(2))?”]
Targeted healthcare initiative stays on the ballot. The court denied review in AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Superior Court, a writ petition that attempted to knock off this November’s ballot the initiative titled “Protect Patients Now Act of 2024.” Bob Egelko gives a detailed report on the initiative and its backstory in “California voters can decide ballot measure targeting L.A. nonprofit, state Supreme Court rules.” It begins, “The California Supreme Court refused Wednesday to remove from the November ballot an initiative backed by apartment owners that would prohibit one man, a wealthy health care executive and supporter of rent control, from spearheading future ballot measures.” The writ petition was filed in April in the Third District, which summarily denied the petition two months later. The Supreme Court last month ordered a different initiative from the ballot.
Three votes for review in a double jeopardy case. The court denied review in People v. Barooshian, but just barely, as Justices Goodwin Liu, Martin Jenkins, and Kelli Evans all recorded dissenting votes. The Fourth District, Division One, published opinion affirmed a conviction of drunk-driving murder. A previous jury had hung on the murder charge, but convicted the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and the defendant asserted a double jeopardy claim based on the contention the manslaughter charge was a necessarily included offense of the murder charge. Relying on People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, not a double jeopardy case, Division One said gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder and it refused to endorse “an unprecedented extension” that would “bar subsequent prosecution for offenses that are merely lesser related offenses.”
Two votes for review in two youth offender parole cases. The court also denied review in People v. Freeman and People v. Quesada over recorded dissenting votes in both by Justices Liu and Evans. Both cases were decided by unpublished Second District opinions, Freeman from Division Three and Quesada from Division Seven. The defendants were serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed after they turned 18 years old and they unsuccessfully challenged their statutory ineligibility for youthful offender parole hearings as unconstitutional under equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment principles. Last month, the two justices filed a separate statement dissenting from the denial of review in a similar case, arguing the Supreme Court should decide the cruel and unusual punishment issue.
Batson legislation reversal. The court denied a district attorney’s request to depublish the 2-1 Second District, Division Six, published opinion in People v. Uriostegui. The majority reversed a residential burglary based on Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which the opinion said was enacted “to help eradicate the improper removal of jurors based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or membership in another specified protected group.” The majority held invalid the practice of giving “a facially neutral reason . . . to remove a juror—such as “lack of life experience”—[that] is based on a presumptively invalid reason, such as lack of employment or demeanor.” The dissent said, “I applaud the Legislature’s recognition that implicit bias — an unconscious trait we all carry within us whatever our race, background, or life experience — has no place in our judicial system. . . . Yet I seriously doubt the majority’s literal interpretation of . . . section 231.7 requires reversal here.” [Update: Just last week, Justices Liu and Evans filed a separate statement discussing section 231.7.]
Dependency depub. The court denied the petition for review in In re Ca.M., but it granted two requests to depublish the Second District, Division Five, partially published opinion. Division Five followed “language” in In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, an opinion Division Five said “has not since been disapproved.” The I.J. language was a quote from a Court of Appeal opinion: “ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 773.) Division Five found substantial evidence that supported one jurisdictional finding the appealing mother did not challenge was enough to avoid ruling on the one finding she did challenge. The appellate court also concluded the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, giving discretion to decide moot issues (see here), did not “require reviewing courts to invariably consider whether to exercise their discretion to decide a parent’s challenge to one adverse jurisdiction finding even if there are other adverse findings against the parent that are uncontested.”
Parole denial grant-and-transfer. The court granted review in In re Renteria and then sent the case back to the Second District, Division Seven, which had summarily denied a pro per’s habeas corpus petition. Division Seven is directed to issue an order “to show cause why relief should not be granted on the grounds petitioner’s reincarceration for his 2021 parole violation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions and that the Board of Parole Hearings erred by failing to consider youth offender and elderly parole suitability factors at petitioner’s initial parole reconsideration hearing. (See Pen. Code, § 3000.1, subd. (d); Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2775(c).)”
Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were two criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for a decision in People v. Patton (see here) and one more on hold for People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (see here).
Burgos Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here). 17 grant-and-hold cases have left the building. Eight were waiting for only the gang-evidence decision in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1 (see here); review was dismissed in four and four were returned to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration. Review was also dismissed in seven cases that were on hold for Burgos and, earlier, the death penalty appeal in People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 (see here); in one case holding for Burgos, the youth offender parole decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (see here), and the gang crime opinion in People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561 (see here); and in one case holding for Burgos and Rojas.
Will inmates that committed their crime at age 21 be able to petition to be resentenced for adding and abetting attempted murder under the kill zone theory?