In In re Cabrera, the Supreme Court today holds invalid the imposition of a sentence enhancement that was based on a trial judge’s determination the defendant had inflicted “great bodily injury.” The judge’s finding was made after a jury convicted the defendant of battery with “serious bodily injury,” but deadlocked on the specific issue whether he inflicted “great bodily injury.”
The court’s unanimous opinion by Justice Goodwin Liu finds a violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, which held, other than “the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (id. at p. 490). Interpreting Apprendi and other high court opinions, the Cabrera court says the rule requiring a jury finding applies “even if the evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of the judge-found fact.” “Sentencing courts may not peer behind the verdict to assess whether the evidence supports a fact not reflected in the jury’s decision,” the opinion says.
The court acknowledges that “[g]reat bodily injury and serious bodily injury are similar terms; we have more than once called them ‘ “essentially equivalent.” ’ ” Nonetheless, the court explains, “the two terms are not equivalent as a matter of law” and “are distinct.” For Apprendi, the court says, “ ‘ “essentially equivalent” ’ . . . is not enough.”
The court reverses the Third District Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion. This was the second grant of review in the case — after the appellate court had summarily denied the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court almost four years ago granted review and directed the superior court to assess the Apprendi issue. Today’s opinion also disapproves a 1985 decision by the Second District, Division Seven, and a 1992 decision by the Second District, Division Five; the Supreme Court denied review in the Division Five case.
The defendant doesn’t yet get the relief he seeks in this habeas corpus proceeding, however. Because the sentencing issue was raised in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the defendant’s earlier direct appeal, and the Third District didn’t reach the issue whether counsel’s performance was deficient in not raising the Apprendi issue, the case goes back to the appellate court for one more look.