The Supreme Court returns to Los Angeles in December for the first time since April.  With only four cases, it will be a relatively light calendar.  But it will include yet another State Bar matter, this one involving discipline of an attorney instead of the recent arguments that concerned whether applicants should be admitted to practice.

On December 4 and 5, the court will hear the following cases (with the issue(s) presented as stated on the court’s website):

People v. Infante:  Did the Court of Appeal correctly determine that defendant committed independent felonious conduct that elevated his otherwise misdemeanor firearm possession to a felony and supported the charge of being an active participant in a criminal street gang in violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a)?

In re Lira:  Is a life prisoner who is granted parole on a pre-1983 offense entitled to credit against the applicable five-year parole period for the time he or she was incarcerated following the Governor’s improper reversal of a prior grant of parole?

Ennabe v. Manosa:  (1) Is a person who hosts a party at a residence, and who furnishes alcoholic beverages and charges an admission fee to uninvited guests, a “social host” within the meaning of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (c), and hence immune from civil liability for furnishing alcoholic beverages?  (2) Under the circumstances here, does such a person fall within an exception stated by Business and Professions Code section 25602.1 to the ordinary immunity from civil liability for furnishing alcoholic beverages provided by Business and Professions Code section 25602, subdivision (b)?

Interestingly, 16 months after the Ennabe case was fully briefed, the Supreme Court solicited an amicus curiae brief from the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.  Ennabe is one of the older cases on the court’s docket; review was granted in March 2011.

In re Grant:  Did the felony conviction for possession of child pornography suffered by the member of the State Bar in this case involve moral turpitude warranting the member’s disbarment rather than lesser discipline?