One blog post alone could not do justice to all the notable actions the Supreme Court took at its conference yesterday. Part I is here. Here’s Part II.

Racial Justice Act depublication. The court denied review in People v. Vigil, yet another case concerning the Racial Justice Act (see Montgomery, Naddi, and Avalos in Part I), but it depublished the Fifth District’s opinion in the case and it said the review denial was “without prejudice to defendant filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Tulare County Superior Court.” The opinion dismissed an appeal from an order denying the defendant RJA relief, stating the order was void because, “under the RJA’s phased-in retroactivity provisions, defendant’s motion was prematurely filed.”

Lemon Law depublication. The court also denied review and depublished the Court of Appeal opinion in Valdovinos v. Kia Motors America. The Second District, Division Two, interpreted California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, commonly known as the Lemon Law, as it applied to the plaintiff’s purchase of a new 2014 Kia Optima. The appellate court answered “no” to these questions: “is a consumer entitled to recover as ‘restitution’ amounts paid to a third party for a service contract on the vehicle? Second, is a consumer entitled to recover as ‘restitution’ all insurance premiums paid on the vehicle should the consumer continue to drive it (as opposed to only those premiums attributable to coverage against property damage)? Third, is a manufacturer’s, distributor’s, or retailer’s violation of the Act willful [allowing for a civil penalty up to twice the amount of the ‘restitution’ award] as a matter of law if the violation was negligent or if it adequately investigated but could not confirm the existence of a defect yet nevertheless offered to buy back the vehicle on terms that were reasonable at the time the offer was made?”  Horvitz & Levy represented the defendant and opposed the petition for review and the depublication requests.

Two pardon recommendations. The court granted Governor Gavin Newsom’s July requests for constitutionally required recommendations that allows him to pardon Mark Borovitz (for 1980, 1981, and 1984 convictions of non-sufficient funds and a 1987 conviction of grand theft auto) and Joseph Crocker (for a 1995 conviction of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent and a 1996 conviction of possession of a controlled substance for sale). Newsom has a nearly perfect clemency record: he withdrew one request before a ruling, but the court — applying a deferential standard (see here and here) — has approved all 70 of his other requests. That’s better than former Governor Jerry Brown, who had the court without explanation block 10 intended clemency grants. The denial of a request implies that a clemency grant would be an abuse of power.

Dissenting vote in youth offender parole/Three Strikes case. Over the recorded dissenting vote of Justice Kelli Evans, the court denied review in People v. Mason. The Second District, Division Two, partially published opinion rejected constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26. That was the unpublished part, on an issue that has consistently drawn dissenting votes — and one separate statement — from Justices Evans and Goodwin Liu. (See here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here). The published portion “overrule[d]” Division Two’s decision in People v. Hardy (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1429 and followed what it said is the majority of Court of Appeal opinions, with the appellate court now concluding that the Three Strikes Law doesn’t allow for the doubling of an LWOP sentence. Justice Evans didn’t issue a separate statement explaining her recorded vote, so it’s not clear which issue or issues attracted her attention. There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled. It’s also unclear why Justice Liu didn’t vote for review on the youth offender parole issue.

Another dissenting vote in a youth offender parole case. Justice Evans also dissented from the denial of review in People v. Ralls. Unlike in Mason (see above), it seems clear that the dissenting vote concerned the issue whether it is cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution for a statute to prevent parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26. The First District, Division Four, unpublished opinion rejects the constitutional challenge to the statute. As in Mason, it’s unclear why Justice Liu didn’t join Justice Evans in voting to grant review. The Ralls opinion notes Justice Evans’s separate dissenting statement (signed by Justice Liu) in People v. Powell (see here) advocating for review of the cruel-or-unusual-punishment issue, but says, “Perhaps the calls made by Justices Evans and Liu in Powell will be heeded by their colleagues at some point, but it is above our pay grade to do so.”

Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here). The court shed 14 cases that had been grant-and-holds for the August decision in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (see here). All are returned to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration, eight in light of both Lynch and Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 and six in light of just Lynch.