No wonder it took until the last filing day within the 90-day period to decide the capital appeal in People v. Daniels. There are five different opinions in the case today, leading to a reversal of only the death sentence, due to an invalid waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial. Everything else is affirmed. But the court came close to not having a majority agreeing to any disposition at all. A brief per curiam opinion serves as a scorecard for the appeal, recounting where the seven justices stand in the four separate opinions that follow.
The defendant was convicted in a court trial, without a lawyer, of a laundry list of major crimes. There were also two special circumstance findings, which were the basis for the death penalty.
Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar writes what is designated as the lead opinion, which Justices Kathryn Werdegar and Goodwin Liu sign. These three justices believe everything should be reversed — the convictions, the special circumstance findings, and the death penalty — because, they conclude, the defendant’s jury trial waivers were not “knowing and intelligent.” “[T]he court accepted Daniels’s waiver without ever inquiring as to Daniels’s understanding of any substantive aspect of what a jury is,” the lead opinion says. Thus, although Daniels clearly waived his right to a jury trial, the three justices say they “decline to conflate a knowing, intelligent waiver with an emphatic one.” Also, however, the opinion rejects several additional defense arguments — stemming from his waiver of the right to counsel — and all the other justices agree on these points.
Justice Liu issues a concurring opinion, signed by Justice Cuéllar. Noting in detail that “the state of our citizenry’s actual knowledge of basic civics leaves much to be desired,” this opinion stresses the need for explaining the details of a jury trial to a defendant who wants to waive one, especially in a capital case.
Justice Carol Corrigan, joined by Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Ming Chin, writes a dissent on the jury waiver issue, stating that the entire death penalty judgment should be affirmed. These three justices agree the trial judge needs to adequately educate a defendant before the defendant waives a jury trial, but conclude that “[t]here is no requirement that a colloquy be complicated in order to be constitutional” and that “a review of the entire record casts no doubt on Daniels’s understanding.”
Justice Kruger, alone, has a separate opinion both concurring in and dissenting from the lead opinion’s discussion of jury waiver. She concurs with Justice Cuéllar’s opinion on the invalidity of the jury trial waiver as to the penalty phase, but also concurs with Justice Corrigan’s opinion about the adequacy of the waiver as to the guilt phase.
The court was certainly splintered on this case, but it could have been worse. Justice Kruger says that she would have preferred “to order further proceedings to allow the parties to make a more robust record concerning the intelligence of defendant David Scott Daniels’s jury waiver.” If she had stuck to that position, however, there would have been no judgment of the court. So, to avoid that dilemma, she agrees to the disposition that “resolves the case in the manner that most closely reflects my own views on what the record before us establishes about the intelligence of defendant’s jury trial waiver.”
All these opinions raise a question. If Justices Werdegar, Liu, and Cuéllar believe the guilt and special circumstance findings (along with the death penalty) should be reversed, why didn’t they agree to Justice Kruger’s preferred disposition — a remand for further proceedings — that ultimately could have led to a full reversal, instead of unsuccessfully insisting on a full reversal now and allowing the guilt and special circumstance findings to be affirmed? The answer might be that a remand could also ultimately have led to the entire death penalty judgment being affirmed.
To further complicate matters, today is Justice Werdegar’s last day on the court. If her replacement is appointed and confirmed before the time expires to order a rehearing — likely, 90 days from today (see also here) — the new justice, not Justice Werdegar, would vote on any rehearing petition. The new justice could conceivably lead to the death penalty judgment being affirmed in its entirety (if he or she agrees with Justice Corrigan’s opinion) or, alternatively, cause the remand that Justice Kruger wants (if he or she believes that’s the proper disposition and Justices Liu and Cuéllar have second thoughts about how to resolve the case).
A jury trial waiver issue divided the court just two months ago when the court affirmed the death penalty in another case, People v. Sivongxxay. That division was nothing like today’s, however.