In People v. Schuller, the Supreme Court today holds that the issue whether an erroneous failure to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense is prejudicial is subject to heightened review. But instead of doing the review itself, five of the seven justices opt to have the Court of Appeal assess whether reversal of the defendant’s murder conviction is required. Imperfect self-defense establishes voluntary manslaughter instead of murder.
The court’s opinion by Justice Joshua Groban concludes that the error is of “constitutional” dimensions “and is thus subject to review under the federal Chapman standard,” which requires reversal “unless [the reviewing court] concludes that no ‘rational juror who made the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional error].’ ” This is so, the court reasons, because “the failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense amounts to an incomplete instruction on an actual element of murder, namely malice.”
Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans join the court’s opinion, but Justice Liu writes a concurrence (signed by Justice Evans). He would have the Supreme Court hold the instructional error to be prejudicial instead of delegating the determination to the Court of Appeal. Justice Liu also criticizes (again) the court’s decision in People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121 that imperfect self-defense cannot be based on the defendant’s perception of a threat that is entirely delusional. Justice Joyce Kennard authored a partial dissent in Elmore that Liu and Justice Kathryn Werdegar signed. Liu today says that “there is no reason to preclude a claim of imperfect self-defense because of the origin of a defendant’s honest belief” and he urges reconsideration of Elmore “in an appropriate case.”
Sometimes the court will do a harmless-error analysis itself and sometimes it won’t. (See here.) [Update: see also here regarding the court’s other decision today, in People v. Mumin.] As we’ve speculated, not deciding the issue might be because the justices couldn’t agree whether the error was prejudicial.
The court reverses the Fourth District, Division Three, Court of Appeal, published opinion. It also “disapprove[s]” (overrules?) two of its own decisions — People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 and People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987 — to the extent those cases reject a Chapman standard of review for an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion or imperfect defense of others.